Abstract: When the government gives a grant to a private charitable organization, do the donors to that organization give less? If they do, is it because the grants crowd out donors who feel they gave through taxes (classic crowd out), or is it because the grant crowds out the fund-raising of the charities who, after getting the grant, reduce efforts of fund-raising (fund-raising crowd out)? This is the first paper to separate these two effects. Using a panel of more than 8,000 charities, we find that crowding out is significant, at about 72 percent. We find this crowding out is due primarily to reduced fund-raising. Depending on which types of organizations are included in the analysis, crowding out attributable to classic crowd-out ranges from 30% to a slight crowd-in effect, while fund-raising crowd out ranges from 70% to over 100% of all crowd out. Such a finding could have important consequences for how governments structure grants to non-profits. Our results indicate, for example, that requirements that charities match a fraction of government grants with increases in private donations might be a feasible policy that could reduce the detrimental effects of crowding out.
Introduction
When the government gives a grant to a private charitable organization, how much will this displace private donations? This is known as the crowding out problem and is one of the oldest and most important questions in public economics. 1 The classic theory of crowding out is that individual donors, who are also often tax payers, will treat their voluntary private contributions as a substitute for their involuntary contributions through taxation and, as a result, reduce giving to a charity by the full amount of the grant. For this explanation to have traction, donors must treat their gift and the government's contribution as substitutes. A growing body of evidence from both experimental and survey data, however, questions this assumption.
2 The theory also requires that donors are aware of the fluctuations in government grants received by the charity and respond accordingly. While such information eventually becomes publicly available through tax filings of the charities, using IRS form 990, it may not be available to the donors at the time of their contributions.
The classic theory also ignores an important aspect of reality, namely fund-raising.
Fund-raising is a significant undertaking. A typical charity will spend from 5 to 25 percent of its donations on further fund-raising activities. 3 While these activities may be profitable for the organizations, managers of nonprofits are forbidden by law from capturing any of this surplus for themselves. Charity managers, therefore, may see fund-raising as a "necessary evil" and, given the chance, might prefer to divert fund-raising resources to their charitable activities. 4 Moreover, donors and charity watch-dog groups often perceive large fund-raising expenses, rightly or wrongly, as indications of a low-quality charity. Charity Navigator, for instance, gives its lowest rating to a food bank or community foundation that raises fewer than $5 for every dollar spent on fund-raising. 5 Since both donors and managers seem predisposed to dislike fund-raising, a grant to a charity may also crowd out its fund-raising activities. This gives a second indirect way that grants could reduce giving-charities may spend less effort on raising money.
This paper is the first to both estimate crowd out and to decompose it into classic crowding out and indirect crowding out due to reduced fund-raising. Why is this endeavor important? First, crowding out is a hidden cost to government grants, and it is important to understand its magnitude and its causes. Second, the nature of crowding out can have significant consequences for potential government policies toward charities and fund-raising. Suppose, for
instance, that in an attempt to mitigate crowding out the government required that spending by the organization go up by the full amount of the grant, that is, it legislated zero crowding out. If crowding out is entirely due to reduced fund-raising, then this policy is feasible. If, by contrast, crowding out is purely classic and charities are behaving optimally, then the government may be powerless to stop the ill effects of crowding out. Hence, if we are able to find a significant fraction of crowding out is in fact due to endogenous responses of the charity, it expands the policy tools available to a government wishing to maximize the benefits of the tax dollars spent.
We study crowding out and its causes with a panel of tax returns from charitable organizations. We begin with a sample of more than 40 thousand organizations. After excluding organizations that never report private donations, government grants, or fund-raising expenditures and/or appear to have extreme values, we analyze a sample of more than 8,000
organizaitons and close to 40 thousand observations. Our estimates show significant crowding out of about 73 percent-every $1000 grant reduces giving by $727. This figure is slightly higher than prior studies. However, it is robust to a number of different instruments and the inclusion/exclusion of different types of organizations. Most importantly, we find that most of the crowding out is the result of reduced fund-raising. In our preferred specification, all of the crowd-out is attributable to fund-raising. There is no evidence of classic crowding out-in fact we measure a slight crowding in of donors by government grants. If we exclude some groups of organizations, the results suggest that the crowding out attributable to fund-raising is substantial but not complete.
Another interesting finding of our analysis is that charitable fund-raising is highly profitable, with over $5 raised per dollar spent on fund-raising. While this number may strike economists used to profit maximization as somewhat high, it is perfectly in line with ideals of best practices promulgated by the charity watchdog groups and fund-raising professionals, as we show below. That is, while economists see this finding surprising, industry experts would find this return to fund-raising to be just as expected. Below we provide some speculation on the kinds of factors that could explain the effectiveness of fund-raising.
The most important implication of our findings is that they open up a broader set of policy alternatives to the government. According to our estimates, a $1,000 increase in grants will result in classic direct crowding in of $45, reduced fund-raising expenditures of $137, and indirect crowding out due to reduced fund-raising of $772. As a result of the $1,000 grant, total contributions to the charity fall by $727, and the charity nets $410 including the money it saves on fund-raising. If charities were required to maintain current fund-raising expenditures and practices, the charity would would not only preserve its prior donations but also gain $45 in revenue resulting from a slight crowd-in affect of the grant.
This paper is organized as follows. Next we give a brief background to the literature on crowding out, including the motivation for our approach. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 is a conclusion.
Background
The classic model of crowding out, as presented in Warr (1982) , Roberts (1984) , and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) , is derived from the assumption that individuals see their own contribution as a perfect substitute for dollars given by the government. Andreoni (1988) showed that this model of "pure altruism" is unable to explain many simple facts about giving, and also leads to extreme predictions, such as that consumption is independent of redistributions of income. He proposed a new model of impure altruism that assumes individuals experience some joy of giving, or a "warm-glow" (Andreoni, 1989 (Andreoni, , 1990 . Such preferences naturally lead to incomplete crowding out. Empirical research, such as Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) , has been more consistent with a model of warm-glow giving than of pure altruism.
There are many empirical studies on crowding out, and most show that crowding is quite small, often near zero, and sometimes even negative (crowding in). Notable studies include Kingma (1989) , Okten and Weisbrod (2000) , Khanna, Posnett and Sandler (1995) , Manzoor and Straub (2005) , Hungerman (2005) , Borgonovi (2006) , and Gruber and Hungerman (2007) .
Payne (1998) noted that the government officials who approve funding for the grants are elected by the same people who make donations to charities. This means that positive feelings toward a charity will be represented in the preferences of both givers and the government, and that this simultaneity could bias findings against crowding out and could even lead to biased predictions of crowding in. For instance, a hurricane that causes both public and private charity to rise could create this positive bias. Payne (1998) The next natural step in this research is to measure crowding out and ask what fraction of this is due to reduced fund-raising as opposed to classic direct crowding out. We address this question next.
The Nonprofit Data Set
The data on nonprofit revenues and expenses come from federal tax returns filed by IRS are always zero. We also only kept firms with at least three years of observations. We drop firms based on the following rules: organizations that never received a private donations during the period for which we have digitized data (23 organizations); organizations with extreme non-profits. Most of the returns tracked are for non-profits with assets that exceed $500,000. For each year, IRS randomly sampled the non-profit firms within each asset level. As IRS's budget for this study increased, the number of non-profit organizations tracked for a given year also increased. 7 An organization is required to file a tax return if its annual gross receipts are greater than $25,000 and it is not a religious organization. 8 These types of payments are reported on a non-profit's tax return under program service revenue. Program service revenue, however, is not limited to payments by the government; it covers any payment received by the non-profit for the services provided. 9 We used the NTEE classification as it existed in 2005 and kept those firms with a 1-digit classification of I, J, K, L, P, or S. Initially we included firms with an NTEE classification of C (environment) and O (Youth Development). Including these types of organizations in the analysis tended to pull the results to an extreme. We suspect this is due to greater variability in the role played by government funding and the nature of the goods/services provided. For both of these classification of organizations, there is a greater proportion of organizations that never report receiving a government grant than for the remaining organization types.
private donations in one year relative to the private donations received in other years (4 organizations); only 1 year of positive fund-raising expenditures (3941 organizations); 3 or more years of 0 fund-raising (3 organizations); or a reporting of 0 for both liabilities and total occupancy expenses for all years as these are measures being used to predict an organization's fund-raising expenditures (1755 organizations). Of these additional reasons for excluding firms from the analysis, only the exclusion of firms with extreme private donations and the firms with only one year of reported fund-raising expenditures dramatically affect the significance and/or magnitude of the key coefficients.
Our initial sample contained 41,356 organizations with three or more years of observations. After excluding organizations as reported above we are left with a sample of 8,039
charities, and a total of 39,658 observations. All of the dollars are constant (base year 2000).
Overall, the charities average $787 thousand in donations, about $907 thousand in government grants, and spend about $91 thousand on fund-raising (12% of donations). A summary of the data is shown in Table 1 . Reliance on private donations and government grants varies across the different types of organizations.
Estimation Strategy
To identify the effects in which we are interested, we need to find three relationships.
First, we need to know how donations respond to grants, controlling for fund-raising. Second, we need to know how donations respond to changes in fund-raising, controlling for grants.
Third, we need to know how fund-raising responds to changes in grants. A challenge for our estimation is the issue of endogeneity. Unobserved characteristics or events could cause donations, grants, and fund-raising to be correlated. For instance, imagine a natural disaster that makes many people homeless. We are likely to see both giving and grants increase as a result, which would lead to positive biases in the effects of grants on donations. Fund-raising will also be affected by such events, but the potential bias is less clear. If, in this example, the need becomes greater then fund-raising may rise, but if people become more generous when asked for a donation then fund-raising may actually fall. It will be important, therefore, to find instruments for both fund-raising and grants.
Ideally, we would estimate the following equations directly:
In the first equation, private donations (of charity i in county c at time t) are regressed on government grants, fund-raising costs, firm and year fixed effects, and a set of firm, county, and state level controls. In this equation, we are concerned about the endogeneity of government grants, the relationship between fund-raising expenditures (equation 2) and government grants, and omitted variables that are correlated with private donations and government grants or fundraising expenditures. This estimation naturally suggests an analysis with three stage least squares, where we estimate a two equation system with fund-raising as a function of grants, and donations as a function of both grants and fund-raising.
Wooldridge (2002) cautions, however, that there are disadvantages to a systems estimation of (1) and (2) above. For a system method to estimate the coefficients consistently, all equations in the system must be properly specified. If this cannot be assured, then 3SLS or GMM will not be consistent and single equation estimation, such as 2SLS is more robust. 10 We therefore opted to take a more conservative approach and rely on a reduced form two stage least squares analysis. We estimate separately the following three equations:
For all specifications, we use the following controls: program dues revenues collected by the charity, state level individual per capita income, state population, state population squared, the share of the population under the age of 18, the share of the population over the age of 65, annual state level expenditures for Medicare, Medicaid, and income assistance, a dummy variable equal to one if the governor is affiliated with the Democratic party, the share of US Congressional representatives for the state affiliated with the Democratic party, a year trend interacted with the NTEE1 code, and a set of year dummies (one for the period prior to 1998 and separate measures for each year subsequent to 1998). These measures help to control for changes that are occurring in the state and overall that could affect charity operations. Also included are organization fixed effects which capture time-invariant characteristics of the charities and the areas in which a charity is located.
Because equation (1) has been broken into two estimations, we need instruments that explain government funding and instruments that explain fund-raising expenditures. Our approach is similar to that of Gruber (2004) and Gruber and Hungerman (2007) . We can use our estimates from these three regressions to derive our desired predictions. The coefficient A on government grants from the estimation of equation (3) will tell us the total crowd out, combining both the direct and indirect effects. The coefficient B on fund-raising expenditures from the estimation of equation (4) will tell us the productivity of each dollar of fund-raising. Finally, the coefficient C on government grants from the estimation of equation (5) will tell us how much fund-raising falls when grants are received.
We can use these coefficients to decompose the total effect, A. An additional dollar of grants will reduce fund-raising by C dollars, and each dollar of decreased fund-raising results in B dollars less in giving. Hence, the indirect change in donations from reduced fund-raising is B*C, which then means the direct crowding out effect is A -B*C.
Notice that if fund-raising falls, then the charity also conserves some money that would have gone to fund-raising, and can spend this on services. Thus, if we want to discuss crowding out of spending rather than giving, we would call the total effect A -C, and the indirect effect B*C -C. The direct effect stays the same, A -B*C.
Instruments for Government Grants
We need instruments that are correlated with government grants, but not with private donations or fund-raising expenditures. Our instruments rely on election information on races for U.S. Congress. For each firm we smoothed the data so that they are affiliated with one county over the sample period. 11 Initially we linked Congressional representation with the county in which a charity is located and developed a set of measures to reflect the political party affiliation and tenure of the members representing the county. Through much analysis, however, we discovered that the use of county level political measures was tenuous given most of the organizations under study are observed only between 1998 and 2002, a fairly short period for exploiting county level political turnover in the Congress. Instead, we developed a set of measures to reflect the political party affiliation, the distribution of representatives by political party, and the total seniority of the representatives for the state in which a charity is located.
Since elections occur every two years, we get some time variation. We also get variation due to redistricting after both the 1990 and 2000 censuses.
We look to these political variables for instruments because the power of a politician in
Congress may be important in bringing federal dollars to the district, including grants to charitable organizations. The power of the representative will be a function of their tenure, whether their party is in control, and any advantage they enjoy from political fund-raising.
These factors are unlikely to be correlated with private donations and fund-raising expenditures.
For each congressional district we created a measure that reflects the number of years in which the member has been representing the district. This represents the potential "power" of a congressional member based on his/her seniority. For each county we identify the total power of all of the representatives that represent any part of the county. We also compute the power of the representatives based on the member's political party affiliation. Within each state, we have identified the political party with the most representatives. With this information we constructed three measures: the total seniority of the members affiliated with the Republican party, the total seniority of the members affiliated with the Democratic party, and the difference between the seniority of the members affiliated with the political party with the most number of delegates and the seniority of the members affiliated with the party with the fewest number of delegates.
Thus, we use two sets of instruments for the government grants:
• Set 1: Total seniority of the members affiliated with the Democratic and Republic political parties.
• Set 2: Total seniority of the members affiliated with the Democratic party and the difference between the seniority of the members with the most and least Congressional representatives. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for these instruments. Column 1 of Table 3 reports Column 2 of Table 3 reports the coefficients for the measures used in instrument set 2 in the first stage regression. The coefficient on the seniority of the Democratic representatives remains negative but is smaller in magnitude. The coefficient on the measure that reflects the difference between members with greater and lesser representation in Congress is also negative.
This latter coefficient suggests that charities in states with greater power and/or more representatives affiliated with a single political party will have lower levels of government grants. The F-statistics on the joint significance of the instruments is 7.27.
Instruments for Fund-raising Expenditures
Finding instruments that explain fund-raising but do not directly explain either the propensity of individuals to donate or government grants is challenging. Our approach was to identify a set of measures that reflects the financial security of the organization. Arguably, if an organization is facing increasing expenses, it will change its fund-raising efforts in response. We rely on measures of each charitable organization that are reported on the IRS 990 forms. These are the instruments we considered:
• Total liabilities of the organization.
• Total Occupancy expenses. This measure reflects expenses for office space, heating, and other utilities (excluding telephone). Table 2 provides means and standard deviations of the instruments used in the analysis. The coefficients on these instruments in the first stage regression are reported in column 3 of Table 3 .
The F-statistic from the joint significance of the instruments is quite high, 17.44. An increase in both expenses results in an increase in fund-raising expenditures. The reader may be concerned that the financial health of a charity may also affect private donations and/or government grants.
We believe, however, that contemporaneous information on the financial well being of a firm at the time a donation or grant is being given is difficult to ascertain. Donors are likely to only perceive the general well-being of the charity. This perception is controlled for through the use of the organization fixed effects. In contrast, the charitable organization is likely to be keenly aware of its finances and, thus, should be expected to modify it fund-raising efforts to deal with changes in its financial health. From a statistical perspective, as discussed below, we ran various tests for over, under, and weak identification of the instruments and estimated the second stage regression using 2SLS, GMM, and LIML specifications.
Estimation
The results of our analysis are reported in 
Effects from a change in government grants on private donations (A): Panel A
The results under an OLS specification are reported in column 1. 12 We can see clear evidence here of the endogeneity bias discussed earlier. In Panel A, government grants would appear to crowd-in charitable contributions, which indicates a clear positive bias in this coefficient, as predicted. In column 2 we report the results for instrument set 1 for government funding and fund-raising expenditures using a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) method of estimation. In column 3 we report the results for instrument set 2 for government funding, also under a LIML estimation method. In columns 4 and 5 we report the results using instruments set 2 for government funding and the instrument set for fund-raising under a 2SLS
and GMM estimation method, respectively.
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Across the estimations, the over-identification test is satisfied. The results that instrument government grants are stronger when we use the instrument set 2. In all three estimations, the over-identification test is satisfied. Overall, the estimates suggest the total crowd-out of private donations is approximately 72 percent. These estimates are consistent with Payne (1998) , whose estimates ranged from 50 to 78 percent.
Effect of fund-raising expenditures on private donations (B): Panel B
In the instrumental variable regressions, the over-identification test is satistfied although it is weaker for the government grants instrument set 1.. We find coefficients ranging from 5.6-12 For all of the specifications we report robust standard errors. Stock and Watson (2006) suggest that robust standard errors may be preferable to clustered standard errors under a fixed-effects estimation when the number of firms is large and the number of observations per firm is short. 13 The 2SLS, GMM, and LIML estimations were performed using the xtivreg2 program developed by Schaffer (2007) .
5.7, indicating that, on average, a marginal dollar spent on fund-raising yields over five dollars in new donations. This shows that charities are not net-revenue maximizers, but rather leave considerable slack in their fund-raising potential. This is similar to observations of Weisbod and Dominguez (1986) who generally find "fund-raising elasticities" of greater than one for the types of charities we consider here. Our estimates are consistent with the notion of Weisbrod (1988 Weisbrod ( , 1998 ) that charities stop once revenue goals are met and do not maximize net revenues. Instead, they appear to be more closely in line with the benchmarks of best practices promulgated by industry experts and watchdogs.
Effect from a change in government grants on fund-raising expenditures (C): Panel C
In the instrumental variable regressions, the over-identification test is clearly satisfied.
The estimates suggest that fund-raising efforts are reduced by between 10 and 14 cents per dollar of government grants received. Again, these estimates are consistent with earlier findings of Andreoni and Payne (2003) who found coefficients of -0.019 to -0.265.
Decomposition of Crowd-Out Effect
In Column 1 of Table 5 we combine our results to separate the total crowd out into the classic direct crowd out and the indirect crowd out due to reduced fund-raising. The top three rows of Table 5 reproduce the essential parts of Table 4 used in our calculations using the LIML specification and the best set of instruments. The middle panel provides examples combining the within-column coefficients to produce a sample of estimates for direct and indirect crowding out of donations. Across the columns that report the results using an instrumental variables strategy, our results suggest that most of the crowd-out is attributable to a decline in fund-raising.
Approximate 108 percent of crowd-out is from reduced fund-raising. The direct behavior of individual donors is slightly positive, suggestion a slight crowd-in effect by private donors. The crowd-in could, for instance, be due to a signal of quality generated by a government grant, or because the grant allowed for a significant increase in the scale or scope of the organization, thus allowing fundraisers to reach more people.
Importantly, our results support the notion that donors are not completely aware of fluctuations in grants received by the charity or, if they are, the grants do not discourage their giving.
The results just discussed slightly overstate the problem of crowding out. The reason is that if charities reduce fund-raising, then there is money conserved that can be devoted to charitable services. Hence, we may want to add to the direct crowding the marginal savings in fund-raising expenses. In the notation used in section 4, this means crowd out is A -C rather than simply A. The final three rows of Table 5 illustrate crowding out in this case. Since the change in dollars of fund-raising is small relative to the total crowd out, this approach reduces the indirect crowd out by 6 percentage points, our estimate of indirect crowding to 64 percent of the total.
Robustness of Results
Through our transforming the data and our testing of instruments and different specification we discovered that there are many organizations that report arguably extreme (or incorrect) donations, grants, and/or fund-raising expenditures. With more than 8000 organizations, hand checking each organization and trying to verify the information with third party sources is impractical. Therefore, to explore the sensitivity of the results we took two steps. First, we varied our instruments. With slight variations (e.g. including non-linear terms of our instruments), the results are robust. Second, we excluded/included groups of organizations into our analysis. Columns 2-11 of Table 5 summarize our results from this exploration. In Column 2, we included organizations that report positive private donations and fund-raising expenditures but never report a positive level of government grants over the sample period. This increases the sample size to 12,417 organizations and 60,442 observations. Including these additional charities increases the total crowd-out by approximately 10 percent; and the crowd-out attributable to fund-raising behavior also increases. The effect of fund-raising on private donations, however, remains the same. Overall, including these organizations increases the standard errors but does not change the conclusion that the bulk of crowding out is attributable to a decline in fund-raising behavior.
In columns 3-7 of Table 5 , we excluded organizations from the analysis based on their NTEE 1 coding. 14 Excluding just one group of organizations changes the estimation of crowdout and the allocation of the crowd-out between direct and indirect channels. Overall, the various experiments reported in columns 2 to 11 in Table 5 support the basic conclusion of our preferred specification.
Discussion
In this section we evaluate how our results compare to prior finding and to expectations we might form by looking at the actual practices of charities, and then go in to interpret how our results could shape future discussions of policy toward government grants to charities.
Evaluating the Results
Our results from Panel A in Table 4 are quite similar to finding of Payne (1998) An economist who is trained to look for profit maximization would be troubled to see from Panel B that a dollar spent on fund-raising yields over five dollars of donations. Is this result reasonable?
First, there are strong reasons to believe that fund-raisers are not net revenue (profit) maximizers. Weisbrod (1988) , for instance, observed that charities do not maximize net revenues and suggested that non-profits are "satisficers" that set fund-raising goals to meet other objectives. Because of the non-profit status of charities, the managers get no direct reward from maximizing revenues and cannot appropriate any of the surplus they might achieve. Moreover, pushing a charity to the envelope reduces the enjoyment of public service that charity managers might seek. Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) present a formal model of these ideas, arguing that firms choose non-profit status (rather than for-profit) in order to provide better quality employment for themselves, which does not necessarily imply a desire for expanding program services or for building fund-raising "empires."
Another reason they may not maximize net revenues is pressure from donors to keep fund-raising expenses low. For example, a popular guide to fund-raising (Greenfield, 2002) provides "cost-benefit standards and guidelines" for charities. These indicate that, depending on the fund-raising activity, a "mature" fund-raising program should expect 3 to 10 dollars of donations for each dollar spent on fund-raising (Exhibit 13.3, page 499).
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Likewise, the American Institute of Philanthropy, which provides independent quality ratings of nonprofits, states in its ratings criteria that, "$35 or less to raise $100 is reasonable for most charities,"
indicating a return of about $3 per dollar spent as a minimum criteria for proper management.
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Give.org posts an identical standard. Similarly, the watchdog group Charity Navigator considers "fund-raising efficiency" of $2.5 to $7 raised per dollar spent to be acceptable, depending on the type of charity, and reports a median efficiency across all charities of $10 raised per dollar spent.
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Charities who fail to reach these standards, as a consequence, receive low quality ratings and may see their donations suffer as a result.
One naturally should ask why these industry standards are set at these particular levels. It may be that donors confuse average and marginal costs of fund-raising, and the standards are arbitrary and inefficient. 18 Another possibility is that these standards may be an attempt by the industry to collude on a lower level of fund-raising that protects the industry from "excessive"
and wasteful fund-raising that simply shifts donors between charities without "expanding the pie" of donor dollars available. Identifying why the standards are set at this level, while an extremely interesting question for research, is beyond the scope of this study.
These various theories of non-profit governance and observations from industry observers should lead us to expect a value for B between 3 and 10. The value we measure, 15 They indicate each dollar spent on direct mail should return $4 to $5, on "volunteer-led personal solicitations" and on "capital campaigns" should yield $5 to $10, and on planned giving should earn $3 to $5. See also Greenfield (2002) . 16 See the website for the American Institute of Philanthropy, http://www.charitywatch.org/cirteria.html .
See the website for Charity Navigator, on the page for their ratings tables, http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm/bay/content.view/catid/2/cpid/48.htm 18 Related to this issue is one that concerns whether we are able to estimate the true marginal effect of fundraising on private donations. The within effect of fundraising on private donations that we measured, may, in some instances reflect a local average effect more so than a marginal effect. around 5.6, is in line with the suggested return and "fund-raising efficiency" promoted by these industry experts and non-profit watchdogs.
What Can be Done to Mitigate Crowding Out?
What incentives or restrictions can the government put on its grants that could reduce or eliminate crowding out? Because our results show that the majority of crowding out is due to the actions of the charities themselves, and because fund-raising is still quite productive, the set of alternatives is potentially quite broad.
For example, our results show that, at least for some organizations, if the government adopted a policy that total spending by the charity must rise by 100 percent of the grant amount, charities could meet this goal simply by not altering their fund-raising activities in response to government grants. Myriad other policies, such as requiring private donations to match a fraction of government donations, are potentially feasible actions to remediate crowding out.
The Relative Efficiency of Fund-Raising.
What would be more efficient: a) A $10,000 government grant to a charity that, because of crowding out, raises services of the charity by only $4100; or b) An increase in fund-raising expenditure of the charity of $727 that results in an increase in services of $4100? The answer to this question depends on how the marginal cost of fund-raising compares to marginal cost of public funds, that is, the cost of collecting and spending the $10,000 in tax dollars.
Economists have for many years attempted to measure the cost of collecting taxes. Snow and Warren (1996) summarize these. The cost of a dollar varies across studies from $0.01 to $0.31. One study (Ballard and Fullerton, 1992) even reports a negative cost of -0.078. 19 Of those estimates reported in Snow and Warren, the median estimate (by Stuart, 1984) is 0.072.
In our example, let the cost of public funds be k. Then we would estimate that the $10,000 grant would cost $10,000k but would save $1370 in reduced fund-raising. The government grant will reduce economic efficiency if $10,000k -1370 > 727, that is, if k > 0.210. 20 While the median estimate for k is below this critical value, the critical k is still well within the range of estimates the cost of public funds in the literature, making it difficult to determine whether crowding is welfare enhancing or welfare reducing.
Conclusion
When a charity receives a government grant there can be two paths that lead to lower donations to the charity. First is direct crowding out of givers. Donors who count their contributions through taxation as part of their total contribution will reduce their voluntary contributions to offset the grant. The second path is by crowding out the fundraisers. If charity managers find fund-raising a "necessary evil," or fear it may hurt their evaluation from charity watchdog groups, then a government grant will allow them to redirect efforts from fund-raising to providing charitable services. This means that after getting a grant, charities may simply cut back fund-raising. This is, of course, the first study of its kind. As such, additional studies will be needed to establish the robustness of these results. The finding that crowding out is due to reduced fundraising by the charities opens up many new avenues for both researchers and policy makers to discover ways to understand and address crowding out. Table 4 ; more detailed results for columns 2 -9 are available from the authors. Coefficients in bold are statistically significant at p<0.05 *dF/dG in column 3 is signficantly different from the base regressions is attributable to the organizations classified as I2 organizations (Crime Prevention: Youth Violence/Drunk Driving types of charities) **dD/dF coefficient is different from the coefficient reported in column 1 at a p-value of 0.1028. NTEE C3 Organizations cover natural resources and conservation protection activities; NTEE O2 Organizations cover boys and girls clubs
